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INTRODUCTION
V. Leo Campbell and Kathleen Campbell are the Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-respondents
in this case. This brief will hereinafter refer to them as the "Plaintiffs."
James C. Kvamme and Debra Kvamme are the Defendants/Respondents/Cross-appellants
in this case. This brief will hereinafter refer to them as the "Defendants."
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Did the district court abuse its discretion in disregarding the qffidavit of Kevin
Thompson and denying the Campbells' motion for reconsideration?

APPELLANTS' BRIEF, p. 9.
ARGUMENT
I.

VICTORY BY CONFUSION
The Plaintiffs have carefully, if not craftily, scrambled the oral argument in this case,
the OPINION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTTON FOR RECO:-JSIDERATION, and
the standard of I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B), hoping to garner a victory by confusion. The Defendants will
not let that happen.
The Plaintiffs open their REPLY BRIEF by attempting to "shorten" the Defendants'
"position" in this case to one paragraph:
Decidedly producing vast amounts of argument in their Respondents' Brief,
the Kvammes fail to address directly the issue raised on appeal. Shortened to its
pertinent point, the K vammes' position is stated in paragraph 3 on page 36 of their

1

brief: "They [Rules 1 l(a)(2)(B) and 60(b)(2)] are both subject to the same
standard-that is, both I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B) andl.R.C.P. 60(b)(2) are discretionary,
not mandatory."
See APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF, p. 1.
The foregoing paragraph is actually the third point of five separate points, all of which
"directly address the issue raised on appeal," notwithstanding the Plaintiffs' assertion to contrary.
See RESPONDENTS' BRIEF, pp. 34-40.
Curiously, the Plaintiffs then acknowledge that the third point is "accurate"-that is,
that I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2)(B) and I.R.C.P. 60(b )(2) are discretionary, not mandatory.
So why quote it? Why even mention it? The reason-indeed, the 011/v reason-is to continue
to spin their argument that the trial co mi was somehow confused between I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2)(B) and
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(2):
Thus, while accurately identifying that both motions are addressed to the
discretion of the district comi, the Kvammes overlook the Campbells' argument on
the crucial and differing standards the district court must apply when considering
motions under those separate rules.
See APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF, p. 1.
Once again, the following five points are dispositive:
1.

As this court recalls, in order to spin their argument that the trial co mi was somehow

confused between I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B) and I.R.C.P. 60(b)(2), the Plaintiffs carefully excised and
quoted one paragraph from the transcript of the oral argument. Of course, the transcript of the oral
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is 28 pages long. T. pp. 70-98. No one, including Judge Shindurling, was confused about
the standard:
The decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally rests in
the sound discretion of the trial court.
Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592, 21P.3d908, 914 (2001).
2.

The paragraph, which the Plaintiffs so carefully excised and quoted, was actually a

question to Mr. Manwaring, who had just stated the following:
Mr. :Manwaring:

And it is an abuse of discretion not to consider new evidence
that changes the judgment and reconsider that judgment in
light of that evidence. So we would ask the com1 to grant the
motion.

The Court:

So, Mr. Manwaring, what authority do you have that
an
abuse of discretion not to consider new evidence when it
doesn't comply with 60(b )(2)?

p. 89, LL. 11-18 (emphasis added).
In response, Mr. Manwaring confessed and ultimately admitted that the affidavit of
Kevin L. Thompson was not "new evidence"; instead, it was a belated attempt to cure the evidentiary
and procedural

that the Plaintiffs had so steadfastly chosen to ignore:

We're not telling the court, by the way, we have a brand new survey that
changes everything. It's the same Record of Survey. It's the same item of evidence
relied upon by both parties, but the foundation issue that the court addressed as it
relates to the Affidavit of Counsel is now satisfied by the affidavit of Kevin
Thompson. I think that is appropriate in a motion to reconsider.
T. p. 92, LL. 11-18 (emphasis added).

3.

The fact that Judge Shindurling and Mr. Manwaring discussed I.R.C.P. 60(b)(2) at

oral argument is inapposite.
advisement.

Judge Shindurling took the motion for reconsideration under

T. p. 98, LL. 8-10.

He thereafter entered an OPINION AND ORDER ON

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. R. Vol. IV, p. 771. The OPINION AND
ORDER is decisive, not oral argument.
4.

In his OPINION AND ORDER, Judge Shindurling recited the history of the case, he

set fo1ih the standard of review, he explained his analysis, and he made a decision:
In its October 28, 2011, Opinion and Order, this co mi found that, "[p ]ursuant
to Rule 56( e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the Record of Survey submitted
as an exhibit to Plaintiffs' counsel's affidavit lacks a proper foundation and is not
properly before the court." Although Plaintiffs request this court to reconsider its
opinion in light of the new evidence supplied with their motion, there is no new
evidence with their motion. The evidence is the same Record of Survey performed
by Kevin Thompson that was not properly before the court in the previous motions.
The Plaintiffs have now submitted an Affidavit of Kevin Thompson to lay the proper
foundation for the survey, but the evidence is not new. While Plaintiffs are not
required to present new evidence in a Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) motion for reconsideration,
their motion is based on the court now considering the Record of Survey that was not
properly before the court on the previous motions. This evidence was known to the
Plaintiffs in May of 2011 when they filed for summary judgment and was known to
them when the complaint was filed in this case in June of2010. Based on Rule 56( c)
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and also on the court's Scheduling Order, the
affidavit of Kevin Thompson should have been submitted months ago. Therefore,
as the decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration rests in this court" s
discretion, this court finds that it is too late to now submit an affidavit that could
have, and should have, been submitted months ago. To decide otherwise would
essentially allow Plaintiffs to not comply with the rules of civil procedure and the
court's Scheduling Order and roll the dice with a motion for summary judgment. If
they lose on that motion, under the same rules of civil procedure not complied with

4

originally, they would then be allowed to file endless restructured motions on the
same subject matter.
R. Vol. IV, pp. 772-73.
Judge Shindurling denied the motion. He "conectly perceived the issue as one of discretion,"
he "acted within the outer boundaries of [his] discretion," and he "reached a decision by an exercise
ofreason." Carnell v. Barker Manarrement, Inc., 137 Idaho at 329, 48 P.3d at 659 (emphasis added).
5.

Finally, Judge Shindurling did not apply I.R.C.P. 60(b )(2), he did not use it, and he

did not rely on it. In fact, from top to bottom and from front to back, his OPINION AND ORDER
does not cite it, refer to it, or even include the words I.R.C.P. 60(b )(2).

II.
BECAUSE I SAID SO
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Plaintiffs continue to

that the trial court "must"

consider the purported new evidence-that is, the affidavit of Mr. Thompson. For good measure,
the Plaintiffs even threw the following quote into their REPLY BRIEF:
Whether or not the district court erred in refusing to consider the
new evidence depends upon what the Perreiras wanted the district court to

reconsider. The trial court must consider
that bears on the correctness
of an interlocutory order if requested to do so by a timely motion under Rule
1 l(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
146 Idaho 631, 635, 200 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2009)
(emphasis added).
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The following five points are dispositive:
1.

Evidence is not "new" simply because a party says that it is new. Evidence is ne\v

if it was newly or recently discovered, say, since the date of trial or the entry of judgment, and if it
could not have been discovered before then by reasonable or due diligence 1:

Newly Discovered Evidence. Evidence of a new and material fact, or new evidence
in relation to a fact in issue, discovered by a party to a cause after the rendition of a
verdict or judgment therein. Testimony discovered after trial, not discoverable before
trial by exercise of due diligence.
Black's Law Dictionarv, p. 543 (5th ed. 1983).
The affidavit of Mr. Thompson was not new evidence. The Plaintiffs retained the services
of Mr. Thompson on September 8, 2009. He completed the RECORD OF SURVEY on October 5,
2009. The evidence was there from the get-go.2
2.

Moreover, the affidavit of Mr. Thompson was not new evidence under any definition

of the word, legal or otherwise; again, it was a belated attempt to cure the evidentiary and procedural
issues that the Plaintiffs had so steadfastly chosen to ignore:
By way of reminder, Mr. Manwaring attached a copy of the RECORD OF
SURVEY to his affidavit. He is a lawyer. He is not a professional land

1

See generallv the "Berry" test, I.R.C.P. 60(b )(2), and I.C.R. 34; see also State v. Lankford.
116 Idaho 860, 781P.2d197 (1989) and State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551P.2d972 (1976).
2

0f course, the Plaintiffs refused to provide a copy of the RECORD OF SURVEY to the
Defendants. In fact, the Plaintiffs didn't even attach a copy of the RECORD OF SURVEY to their
complaint.
6

surveyor. He did not prepare the RECORD OF SURVEY, he could not
identify it, he could not authenticate it, he could not lay a proper foundation
for it, it was not based on his personal knowledge, he was not competent to
testify regarding it, and his arguments regarding it were speculative, based on
hearsay, and conclusory.
Plaintiffs did not answer or respond to
for

production

regarding

expert

interrogatories and requests

\Vitnesses

111

accordance

with

LR.C.P. 26(b)(4).
Twice, the Plaintiffs did not disclose Mr. Thompson in accordance with the
cornt's ORDER SETTING PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE AND JURY
TRIAL under l.R.C.P. l 6.
The Plaintiffs repeatedly did not supplement their answers and responses in
accordance with LR.C.P. 26(e)(l)(B).
The Plaintiffs repeatedly did not supplement their answers and responses in
accordance with I.R.C.P. 26(e)(3).
The Plaintiffs did not file an affidavit from Mr. Thompson in support of their
motion for summary judgment in accordance with I.R.C.P. 56(e).
The Plaintiffs did not to file an affidavit from Mr. Thompson in opposition
to the Defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment in accordance with
I.R.C.P. 56(e).
7

The Plaintiffs did not file a motion for a "continuance to permit affidavits to
be obtained" or to cure or otherwise remedy the evidentiary issues in this case
in accordance with I.R.C.P. 56(f).
Instead, the Plaintiffs knowingly and intentionally forged ahead with full
knowledge of the foregoing evidentiary and procedural

and the

requirement upon them to survive the cross-motions for summary judgment.
Thus, only under a tortured definition of the word "new" was the affidavit of Mr. Thompson
new evidence.
3.

In addition, as previously stated, even Mr. Manwaring confessed and ultimately

admitted that the affidavit of Mr. Thompson was not new
We're not telling the court, by the way, we have a brand new survey that
changes everything. It's the same Record of Survey. It's the same item of evidence
relied upon by both parties, but the foundation issue that the court addressed as it
relates to tbe Affidavit of Counsel is now satisfied by the affidavit of Kevin
Thompson. I think that is appropriate in a motion to reconsider.
p. 92, LL. 11-18 (emphasis added).
4.

The trial court immediately saw the potential for manipulation and abuse. the

proverbial devil in the details:
On the one hand, depending on the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration might be

Mr. :\1anwaring represented the plaintiff or ''PHH." One of the issues in that case was whether PHH
was on notice that one of the defendants, Mavis M. Anestos, was deceased. PHH claimed that it did
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not know that she was deceased. In support of its motion for summary judgment, PHH filed a copy
of the "order dismissing Anestos' bankruptcy." The order specifically and expressly stated that Ms.
Anestos was deceased. Notwithstanding the order, the trial comi concluded that "there is no
evidence that PHH was on notice, either actually or constructively." The reason that the trial coun
so concluded is especially noteworthy:
... The copy of the order dismissing Anestos' bankruptcy that PHH had placed in the
record did not include the certificate of service showing that PHH had been mailed
a copy of the order on September 25, 2005. The new evidence that the Perreiras
sought to provide to the court in connection with their motion for reconsideration
included a copy of that ce1iificate of service.
PHH Mortgage Services Corp. v. Pen-eira, 146 Idaho at 635, 200 P.3d at 1184.
On the other hand, depending on the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration might not
be appropriate. As previously stated, a motion for reconsideration is not a subversive stratagem or
clever end run-that is, I.R.C.P. l l(a)(2)(B) is not a scheme or maneuver to prolong a case. to
increase the cost of litigation, to ignore the rules of evidence, to disregard the rules of civil
procedure, to violate the rules of discovery, to snub the orders of the comi, to manipulate the
outcome of a motion for summary judgment, or to engage in endless litigation.
Thus, whether a motion for reconsideration is or is not appropriate depends on the
circumstances. That is the reason that a motion for reconsideration is discretionary, not mandatory.
The trial court summed it up:
... Although Plaintiffs request this court to reconsider its opinion in light of the new
evidence supplied with their motion, there is no new evidence with their motion. The
evidence is the same Record of Survey perfonned by Kevin Thompson that was not
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properly before the co mi in the previous motions. The Plaintiffs have now submitted
an Affidavit of Kevin Thompson to lay the proper foundation for the
but the
in a
evidence is not new. While Plaintiffs are not required to present new
Rule l l(a)(2)(B) motion for reconsideration, their motion is based on the court now
considering the Record of Survey that was not properly before the court on the
previous motions. This evidence was known to the Plaintiffs in May of 2011 when
they filed for summary judgment and was known to them when the complaint was
filed in this case in June of 2010. Based on Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure and also on the court's Scheduling Order, the affidavit of Kevin
Thompson should have
submitted months ago. Therefore, as the decision to

grant or denv a motion for reconsideration rests in this court's discretion. this
court finds that it is too late (Q11J!~' submit an amdavit that could have, and should
have, been submitted months ago. To decide otherwise would essentiallv allow
Plainti(fs to not complv with the rules of civil procedure and the court's
Scheduling Order and roll the dice with a motion for summarv judgment. !(they
lose on that motion, under the same rules of civil procedure not complied with
originallv. thev would then be allowed to file endless restructured motions on the
same subject matter.
R. Vol. IV, pp. 772-73 (emphasis added).
5.

finally, this comi, too, has seen the devil in the details and, when it did,

it ummimouslv affirmed the trial court's decision to deny the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.
The following case, which the Defendants cited in their opening brief, is right on point
... The court found that plaintiffs had failed to disclose Bidstrup as an expert witness
in violation of the court's scheduling order .

. . . Even after the defendants filed motions for summary judgment, arguing that
Bidstrup had not been disclosed as an expert witness, and filed motions to strike
Bidstrup's second affidavit for lack of qualification and improper rendering of
opinions on questions of law, appellants made no effort to remedy the situation.
Citing I.R.C.P. 26(b )(4), the district court did not allow Bidstrup' s testimony in the
form of his second affidavit.
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The district court's decision striking Bidstrup's second affidavit is affirmed .
. . . The appellants had ample notice of the hearing and knew what was required of
them to survive the summary judgment motions. Appellants did not establish that
a genuine issue of material fact existed. The grants of summary judgment are
affirmed.

"The decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration
generally rests in the sound discretion of the trial court." Jordan v.
Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592, 21P.3d908, 914 (2001).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants' motion
for reconsideration. The court exercised reason in reaching its decision that the
appellants had been given numerous opportunities to prepare their case. They were
aware of the defendants' motions for summary judgment and motions to strike
Bidstrup's second affidavit. They made no effort to request an extension of time
before the hearing, nor did they address or correct the deficiencies in the affidavit.
Instead, after the court issued its order, they requested a time extension to submit
additional affidavits or retain another expert. The court found that the appellants had
been given several opportunities to remedy the issues raised by the defendants in
their motions. Based on the record before the district court, it did not abuse its
discretion in denying appellants' motion for reconsideration.
Carnell v. Barker Management. Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 48 P.3d 651 (2002).
III.
GAME CHANGER
Every year, the Merriam-Webster Dictionary adds new words to its dictionary. This year.
it added the word "game changer":
A newly introduced element or factor that changes an existing situation or activity
in a significant way.
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A motion for reconsideration has its place in the judicial system. No one questions that.
Depending on the circumstances, it can be an important and effective tool "to obtain a full and
complete presentation of all available facts, so that the truth may be ascertained, and justice done.
as nearly as may

" Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'] Bank of North Idaho, 118 Idaho 812,

823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990).
So, if evidence is, in fact, new evidence-that is, newly discovered and could not have been
discovered earlier by due diligence, then a motion for reconsideration might be appropriate. Again,
it depends on the circumstances.
The Plaintiffs, however, want this court to expand the scope or role of a motion for
reconsideration. Indeed, they want this court to not only coLmtenance the use of a motion for
reconsideration under the following circumstances, but to make its application mandatory, to state
that the trial courts "mu,.,_(" apply it:
As previously stated, the Plaintiffs retained the services of Mr. Thompson on
September 8, 2009. He completed the RECORD OF SURVEY on October 5,
2009.
However, notwithstanding their knowledge of Mr. Thompson and the key
importance of the RECORD OF SURVEY in this case,

Plaintiffs simply

attached a copy of the RECORD OF SURVEY to the affidavit of
is not a professional land surveyor. 1-Ie

Mr. Manwaring. He is a lawyer.

did not prepare the RECORD OF SURVEY, he could not identify it, he could
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not authenticate it, he could not lay a proper foundation for it, it \Vas not
based on his personal knowledge, he was not competent to testify regarding
it, and his arguments regarding it were speculative, based on hearsay, and
conclusory.
The Plaintiffs did not answer or respond to the inten-ogatories and requests
for

production

regarding

expert

witnesses

111

accordance

with

I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4).
Twice, the Plaintiffs did not disclose Mr. Thompson in accordance with the
court's ORDER SETTING PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE AND JURY
TRIAL under I.R.C.P. 16.
The Plaintiffs repeatedly did not supplement their answers and responses in
accordance with I.R.C.P. 26(e)(l)(B).
The Plaintiffs repeatedly did not supplement their answers and responses in
accordance with I.R.C.P. 26(e)(3).
The Plaintiffs did not file an affidavit from Mr. Thompson in support of their
motion for summary judgment in accordance with I.R.C.P. 56(e).
The Plaintiffs did not to file an affidavit from Mr. Thompson in opposition
to the Defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment in accordance with
I.R.C.P. 56(e).
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The Plaintiffs did not file a motion for a "continuance to permit affidavits to
obtained" or to cure or otherwise remedy the evidentiary issues in this case
in accordance with l.R.C.P. 56(£).
Instead, the Plaintiffs knO\>vingly and intentionally forged ahead with full
knovvledge of the

evidentiary and procedural issues and the

requirement upon them to survive the cross-motions for summary judgment.
The mandatory application of a motion for reconsideration under

foregoing circumstances

is not merely an expansion ofl.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2)(B), it is a distention ofI.R.C.P. 11 ( a)(2)(B). In short.
it's a game changer.

current and future members of the bar and judiciary of the state ofldaho, this co mi needs to state the
following in plain and simple terms: (a) Whether they must honor and comply with the rules
evidence, the rules of civil procedure, the rules of discovery, and the orders of the court: or
(b) whether they can violate and

them because I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B) swallows them whole.

Again, the Plaintiffs' position is a game changer. The trial court rejected it. So, too. should
this court:

... To decide otherwise would essentially allow Plaintiffs to not complv with the
rules of civil procedure and the court's Scheduling Order and roll the dice with a
motion for summarv judgment. l(thev lose on that motion, under the same rules
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of civil procedure not complied with originally, they would then be allowed to file
endless restructured motions on the same subiect matter.
R. Vol. IV, p. 773 (emphasis added).

Nonetheless, if a game changer is now afoot in the state ofldaho, the following hvpothetica/
opinion3 would be sufficient to announce it:
The Idaho Supreme Court hereby rules that motions for reconsideration under
LR.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B) are mandatory, not discretionary. Thus, any and all trial courts of
the state of Idaho must hereafter consider motions for reconsideration; they no longer
have the discretion to do so, no matter the circumstances. In addition, any and all
parties to litigation, as well as their attorneys of record, are now free to do the
following: (a) They are free to ignore the rules of evidence; (b) they are free to
disregard the rules of civil procedure; (c) they are free to violate the rules of
discovery, including, without limitation, the rules of discovery that relate or otherwise
pertain to the disclosure of expert witnesses; and (d) they are free to snub the orders
of the court, including, without limitation, orders under I.R.C.P. 16. Any party who
receives an adverse interlocutory order, opinion, or judgment from any trial court may
then use such adverse interlocutory order, opinion, or judgment as a legal map to
restructure such party's case, position, evidence, or argument and thereupon file a
motion for reconsideration, or motions for reconsideration. To this end, the Idaho
Supreme Court hereby rules that I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B) subsumes and supercedes any and
all rules and orders of the trial court. In addition, the Idaho Supreme Court hereby
acknowledges and agrees that this ruling will prolong litigation, increase the cost of
litigation, and result in endless litigation. Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court hereby
amends and modifies I.R.C.P. l(a)-specifically, the Idaho Supreme Court hereby strikes
any and all language therein that states that the rules of civil procedure shall be
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.
Finally, the Idaho Supreme Court hereby overrules its decision in Carnell v. Barker
Management, Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 48 P.3d 651 (2002), if and to the extent that
anything therein conflicts with this ruling.

3

The font for the hypothetical opinion is Comic Sans. It just seems
15

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.
Based on
doctrine ofright result-v.Tong theory. is the doctrine
adverse possession a sufficient and proper basis for the disposition of this

Based on the doctrine o_f right result-wrong theory. is the doctrine
boundary by agreement or acquiescence a sufficient and proper basis for the
dfaposition o_f this case?
2.

CROSS-APPELLANTS' BRIEF, p. 12.
ARGUMENT
I.

DEJA VU
In their REPLY BRIEF, the Plaintiffs attempt to state-really, re-characterize-the Defendants'
"position" in this case:
On cross-appeal, the Kvammes contend the district court made the correct
decision to grant summary judgment in their favor albeit on the wrong tlteorJJ.
See APPELLANTS' REPLY

p. 3 (emphasis added).

That is not the Defendants' position in this case. The Defendants do not "contend" or
otherwise argue that the trial court "made the correct decision" but on the "wrong theory."
Once again, the Plaintiffs have carefully, if not craftily, scrambled the issues in this case.
Once again, the Plaintiffs are hoping to garner a victory by confusion. Once again, the Defendants
will not let that happen.
So that there is no confusion about the Defendants' position
"made the correct decision" and it did so on the right "theory."
16

this case: The trial court

According to the Plaintiffs, the fence in this case does not sit on the boundary between the
parties' respective parcels of real property; instead, it sits on their parcel of real property and is off
by 15 feet. The Plaintiffs bore the burden ofproofon this issue.
In an attempt to carry their burden of proof, the Plaintiffs simply attached a copy of the
RECORD OF SURVEY to the affidavit of Mr. Manwaring. Again, Mr. Manwaring is a lawyer. He
is not a professional land surveyor. He did not prepare the RECORD OF SURVEY, he could not
identify it, he could not authenticate it, he could not lay a proper foundation for it, it was not based
on his personal knowledge, he was not competent to testify regarding it, and his arguments regarding
it were speculative, based on hearsay, and conclusory.
Thus, the RECORD OF SURVEY was not admissible.
The Defendants disagreed with the Plaintiffs; however, rather than merely argue with them,
the Defendants filed the AFFIDAVIT OF KIM LEAVITT, dated June 7, 2011.
Mr. Leavitt is a professional land surveyor.

He has the education, knowledge. ski IL

experience, and training to detem1ine the true and correct boundaries of real property, including,
without limitation, the true and conect location of fences and other improvements thereon.
Unlike Mr. Manwaring, Mr. Leavitt was competent to testify regarding the true and correct
location of the fence in this case. See l.R.E. 702.
The AFFIDAVIT OF KIM LEAVITT duly evidenced that the fence does not sit on the
Plaintiffs' parcel of real property and it is not off by 15 feet; instead, it sits on the boundary between
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the Plaintiffs' parcel of real property and the Defendants' parcel of real property and it marks the
boundary between them.
Thus, the Plaintiffs did not cmTy their burden of proof on this issue; allegations in pleadings
and arguments of counsel are not sufficient:
... When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's
pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule,
must set f01ih specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party
does not so respond, summary judgment ... shall be entered against him.
See I.R.C.P. 56(e).
The trial court agreed:
Pursuant to Rule 56(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the RECORD
OF SURVEY, submitted as an exhibit to Plaintiffs' counsel's affidavit, lacks a
proper foundation and is not properly before the court. Therefore, the Plaintiffs have
failed to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
As such, and based on the evidence properly before the court, it appears that the
fence is the boundary line between the parcels owned by Plaintiffs and Defendants.
R. Vol. IIL p. 606 (emphasis added).
II.

LEFT HANGING
The cross-motions for summary judgment in this case addressed the following three issues:
1.

The true and correct location of the fence;

2.

The doctrine of adverse possession;

3.

The doctrine of boundary by agreement or acquiescence.
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trial court duly and properly disposed of the first issue;

it "made the correct

decision" and it did so on the right "theory."
However, the trial court did not dispose of the second and third issues-namely, the doctrine
of adverse possession and

doctrine of boundary by agreement or acquiescence:

... The remaining issues argued bv counsel regarding adverse possession and
boundarv bv acquiescence do not need to be addressed.
R. Vol. Ill, p. 606 (emphasis added).

III.
RIGHT RESCLT-WRONG THEORY
Thus, the Defendants' position in this case is simple and straightforward: If this court
decides to reverse the trial court on the first issue, then the second and third issues are perfect issues
for application of the appellate doctrine of right result-wrong theory:
doctrine of right result-wrong theory] applies to issues where an alternative
rule of law can be applied to a given body of facts, yielding the same legally correct
answer.
A!!rodvne, Inc. v. Beard, 114 Idaho 342, 348, 757 P.2d 205, 211 (Idaho App. 1988).
Stated otherwise, if this court decides that the trial court "made the wrong decision" on the
first issue, the doctrine of adverse possession and the doctrine of boundary by agreement or
acquiescense still yield the same result-that

the right result.
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IV.
YOU CAIX'T DO THAT

In light of the fact that the trial court did not dispose of the second and third issues, the

This court has generally held that, where an order of a lower court is correct,
but is based upon an enoneous theory, the order will be affirmed upon the correct
theory. We therefore review the theories advanced by the seller in order to determine
if they provide a basis for upholding the trial court's granting of partial summary
judgment. The trial court, however, made no finding on whether the order form
was intended as a fullv integrated agreement. The trial court is the appropriate
forum for such a determination and, as such, the trial court should be given the
opportunity on remand to make such a determination.

With all due respect, the Plaintiffs are wrong. The above-cited case is different than this
case. There, the trial court had not made a particular finding that was required for the other
theory-namely, "whether the order form was intended as a fully integrated agreement."
In this case, that is not a problem.

The CROSS-APPELLANTS'

detail, the undisputed facts in support of each and element

m

third issues.

sets forth,
the second and

CROSS-APPELLANTS' BRIEF, pp. 12-44.

The Plaintiffs rant and rave about the "record before the district court" and the "volumes of
affidavits, deposition testimony, and counter affidavits"
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this case.

APPELLANTS' REPLY

BRJEF, p. 4. However, the Plaintiffs did not and do not set forth one single fact "showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial." See I.R.C.P. 56(e).
Two examples will suffice:
1.

The Plaintiffs note that the Defendants "have not presented any other survey to the

district court on which they base their claims." See APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF, p. 5.
True, but only in part: The Defendants readily acknowledge that they did not "present any
other survey to the district court"; however, their "claims" are not based on a survey. Their "claims"
do not require a survey. In fact, their "claims"-that is, the doctrine of adverse possession and the
doctrine of boundary by agreement or acquiescence- are applicable, whether or not there is a survey,
or despite a survey.
Thus, even if the Plaintiffs had carried their burden of proof on the first issue-that is,
even if the Plaintiffs had shown that Mr. Thompson's RECORD OF SURVEY was admissible,
that the fence does not sit on the boundary between the parties' respective parcels of real property,
that the fence sits on their parcel ofreal property, and that the fence is off by 15 feet-the second and
third issues were nonetheless dispositive: The Defendants have adversely possessed the 15 feet of
farm ground that lies north of the fence and, in addition, the fence has become the boundary in this
case by agreement or acquiescence. Again, the second and third issues in this case, or either of them,
are sufficient and proper bases for the disposition of this case, with or without a survey.
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2.

According to the Plaintiffs, the Defendants have not paid the taxes on the 15

of

farm ground that lies north of the fence:
... The K varnrnes contend that they have paid the taxes on all land extending north
of the disputed fence line. Their contention is grounded upon their theory that the
north half of the section is, in fact, the fence line. That contention is refuted by
Thompson's survey and his affidavit.
See APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF, p. 5.
True, but

only in part: The Defendants readily acknowledge that they "contend" that

they have paid the taxes on the 15 feet of farm ground that lies north of the fence; however, their
"contention" is "grounded" in the law, duly enunciated by this court, and the affidavit of
l\1r. Thompson makes absolutely no difference, one way or the other:

In the case of boundary disputes between contiguous landowners, where one
landowner can establish continuous open, notorious and hostile possession of an
adjoining strip of his neighbor's land, and taxes are assessed bv lot number or b,E
government survev designation, rather than by metes and bounds description,
[!.avment oftaxes on the lot within which the disputed tract is enclosed satisfies the
tax pavment requirement of the statute.
Standall v. Teater, 96 Idaho 152, 156,

P.2d 347, 351 (1974); see also Scott v. Gubler, 95 ldaho

441, 511P.2d258 (1973) (emphasis added).
The legal description of the Defendants' parcel of real property is the N

the

R. Vol. II, p. 252.
The legal description of their parcel of real property is not a legal description based on metes
and bounds-that is, a legal description based on specific calls of directions and distances from a
stated point of beginning; instead, it is a legal description based on a standard section of land under
22

the U.S. Public Land Survey System, which nominally contains 640 acres. R. Vol. I, p. 190, ~ 78:

=:..==R. Vol. JI, p. 301, ': 12 (pp. 297-306, inclusive); and see also R. Vol. II, pp. 307-13.
''payment of taxes on the lot within which the disputed tract is enclosed satisfies the

351 (1974). Of course, the "disputed tract" in this case is enclosed"within" the real property that
lies north of the fence, which is the Defendants' parcel of real property.
In sum, the Plaintiffs' claim that this court cannot dispose of the second and third issues is
wrong. This court can dispose of them and the following case provides direct precedent for it:
It is unnecessary to determine whether the Mussells are liable based upon a
breach of their duty under Idaho Code Section 55-310 to provide lateral support
because they are liable for m1reasonably interfering vvith the Irrigation District's
easement. \Vhere the lower court reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory,
this court will affirm the order on the conect theory. Row v. State, 135 Idaho
21 P.3d 895 (2001 ). Even if the theory adopted by the district court was erroneous,
the Mussells are liable based upon
theory, alleged by the Irrigation District in
its amended comp!aint, that the Mussells unreasonably interfered with the Irrigation
District's easement.

(emphasis added).

v.
NO CALL
If this court decides to reverse the trial court on the first

and, in addition, if this court

does not want to dispose of the second and third issues, then this court should remand the second and
third issues to the trial court before it enters its opinion herein in accordance with l.A.R. 13.3(a):

otherwise, a second appeal of this case is literally right around the corner. Of course, if this court
decides to affirm the trial court on the first issue, then the second and third issues become moot and
this court does not need to remand to them to the trial court.

CONCLUSION
The trial court duly and properly denied the Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.
It "correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion," it "acted within the outer boundaries of its

discretion," and it "reached a decision by an exercise of reason." Carnell v. Barker Manarrement,
Inc., 137 ldaho at 329, 48 P.3d at 659.
The Defendants are entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal. The trial comi did not
"apply the wrong legal standard" to the Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. The Plaintiffs'
argument, based on one paragraph from oral argument, that the trial court "incorrectly" applied

I.R.C.P. 60(b )(2) and "glossed over" I.R.C.P. l 1(a)(2)(B) is spin. It is also frivolous, unreasonable,
and without foundation. Again, the trial court did not apply I.R.C.P. 60(b )(2), it did not use it. and
it did not rely on it. Again, from top to bottom and from front to back, the OPINION AND ORDER
does not cite it, refer to it, or even include the words I.R.C.P. 60(b)(2).
Dated November 30, 2012.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I served two copies of the foregoing RESPONDENTS' REPLY BRIEF on the following
people on November 30, 2012:
Just Law Office
Attn: Charles C. Just and Kipp L. Manwaring
381 Shoup Avenue
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
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